Discursive Fields and Military Transformations: Poland and the Baltic States as Legitimate Members of NATO
Despite a wide array of normative statements assuming a yet-to-come homogenization of defence structures of the new members of NATO’s “common strategic culture”, Eastern European members, ten years on, have continued to develop their militaries mostly for territorial defence. Since few (but interesting) qualitative changes in their structures raise questions about the “homogenization” thesis, this article explores the cases of Poland and the three Baltic States. It sheds light on the fact that military reforms in a context of collective security, such as NATO enlargement, are best seen as a materialization of combined discourses of identity representations within a space allowed by the discursive field itself.
Research Fields :Political Science
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1The immediate post-Cold War years marked the acceleration of major transformations in military institutions throughout Europe. This process, as some Western observers have said, had to go in a single direction. Thanks to linkages never seen before, particularly through NATO enlargement in Eastern Europe to new post-communist (or post-Soviet) members, reforms were inspired by “liberal-democratic” collective identity shared at that point on both sides of the former Iron Curtain. “Enlightened” elites would finally fight against traditional military cronyism and they would guide the reforms in three general areas in which NATO would play the role of “mentor”: “we” would “democratize” control of the armed forces; “we” would reorient the structures of the armed forces from territorial defence to deployability and flexibility (on the expeditionary force model); and, more importantly, “we” would present ourselves as liberal-internationalists, like the West.
2More than ten years on, after the accession of the first “new members” from the East in NATO, the time has come to question such assumptions of structural “homogenization”, inspired by some psychosociological factors related to an acquired “identity”. In order to do this, we will consider those statements as themselves part of a particular discourse, proposing specific identity representations (combining Self and Other), and evolving inside a larger discursive field. Instead of chauvinistically assuming the superiority of some military norms, technicalities or identities, themselves propelling military reforms, the following pages propose another sociological angle from which to observe military transformations, by identifying the discursive field linked to NATO enlargement, its various dominating discourses, and by then observing the materialization in military structures of identity representations defining the “normality”. Four cases will be used in presenting a general but also specific picture of that process, which occurred principally between 1991 and 2006: Poland and its well established military structures, and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and their military structures that, at the period of independence in 1991, were practically starting from scratch.
3After presenting some conceptual elements surrounding our discursive ontology, the outline of the discursive field of NATO enlargement will be qualified by identifying its five dominant discourses (technical, Atlantist, nationalist, grey-zone and return-to-Europe), taken from the broad “expert” (civil, political, military) literature on NATO’s Eastern enlargement. Then, a detailed interpretation of official NATO representations (declarations and official documents), and some general takes on the discursive field will help to identify which discourse served to designate “normality”. Thereafter, a series of targeted interviews held in Brussels in March 2010 with national delegates, a content analysis of NATO Review (published under the auspices of the NATO Secretariat) and reports from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA), giving a reading of the minds of those responsible for accession ratifications, will offer the necessary balance in order to grasp the dominant discourses in those debates, which are too often held behind closed doors.
4Official representations coming out of NATO were, in this order, not dominated by one, but by a combination of discourses, giving the “normality” of the Self an image that was always very imprecise, making it difficult for aspiring states to represent themselves as legitimate and compatible. Identity ambiguities in their official representations (identified in addresses by local elites before pan-European audience) reflect this pattern. However, the problem would be resolved by the discursive combination itself. It would offer a specific “normality”, translated not as naive “Westernization”, but in cooperation in defence. The specific materialization ensuing from this combination would be simplified in the final analysis in military structures, always oriented toward territorial defence, but combining for now with small and flexible specialized elites.
- 1 Cf. T. Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO” in The Cultu (...)
- 2 J. Der Derian, “The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard”, in On Security, R (...)
- 3 D. Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (revised e (...)
- 4 M. Foucault, Sécurité, Territoire, Population: Cours au Collège de France 1977-1978, Seuil/Gallimar (...)
- 5 Ibid.; C. Murphy, International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance since 1850, O (...)
- 6 L. Hansen, ibid, pp. 1-2, 6-8
- 7 Cf. R. Bleiker, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press, Camb (...)
- 8 L. Hansen, ibid., pp. 32-33.
5To imagine NATO as a homogenous whole of practices1 is to assume, constitute, the collective identity that we hope only to describe. To avoid this trap, we need to look closely at identity representations that contain the discourses. Instead of conceptualizing collective identity as a shared “mode-of-living”, identity (a Self) is better understood as a desire for security versus an “external” danger, an uncertain Other, different from “us”2. With the continued discursive repetition of this difference, of these dichotomies based on a superiority/inferiority relationship (like “interior/exterior”, “order/disorder” or “normal/abnormal”), limits as drawn are being materialized3. The discursive act and the identity of Self and Others that it contains can be a powerful disciplinary and ordinating strategy of the social environment4. In this logic, such a discourse does not appear by itself: it needs “experts” having “knowledge” in a specific field, for example in strategy, ethnology, biology, mysticism, statistics, etc.5 Installed in the discursive field once created (i.e. the public arena of competition where different discourses meet), the discourse would not be “managed” intentionally by any particular actor, but be adopted or rejected depending on the problem/legitimate solutions that it offers6. It is important to specify that a discourse that holds an hegemonic position within the discursive field7, this unmovable “normality”, must be seen as pure illusion: every enemy can be acting as a friend, every “event” in real life always brings the risk of forcing the discourse to transform or distort itself, or to give way to an alternative one8.
- 9 R. Bleiker, op. cit, pp. 127-128.
6Inside a state, the passage from the abnormal to the normal happens (in part) by the ritualistic act of citizenship, as it happens in NATO with membership. The “normality” to which candidates looked to be admitted to, constituted by official representations sustained by NATO, could discipline without directly constraining. However, NATO is not an actor “possessing” any “power”: it is only a political site where diverse discourses fight to be inscribed as the dominant one, as the “normal”9. Therefore, the post-Cold War period and its multiple “events” could only fuel the intense divisions throughout the discursive field, between various discourses coming from different moral, geopolitical and technological expertises. The vigorous political and academic debates are, as such, proof: there was not one normality, one set of problems/solutions, one representation of the Self and the Other, one monopolistic discourse in NATO. For sure, each discourse was not totally independent of the others: each of them was based on generally assumed ideas of a Self (NATO) to be differentiated from the rest of the world, be it in axiological or purely military terms. However, the five ideal-types that follow must be considered separately to better see the tensions and instabilities they produce between themselves.
- 10 In a large body of work, see for example: M. Clarke, P. Cornish, “The European Defence Project and (...)
7NATO is presented here as the technical and sociopolitical military model. Its armed forces, arch-typified by the United States, are not only controlled by legislative bodies, but also staffed by “professionals”, ready for high intensity asymmetrical fighting, anti-terrorism warfare, and rapid and flexible deployments. The success of the alliance stands therefore on its military capabilities that must constantly be maintained at the apex of expeditionary interoperability. In this context, candidates were described as totally misadapted for NATO: their armed forces were lacking finance, training, equipment, and were, moreover, established on “old” territorial defence schemes (heavy armoured divisions staffed by conscripts).
- 11 S. Cambone, “Will the US Senate endorse NATO’s enlargement?”, NATO Review, November 1997.
8When the idea of enlargement became unavoidable, this (anti-enlargement) discourse adapted itself to be seen as the most severe and depoliticized normalizing discourse: candidates needed to democratize their armed forces (i.e. be controlled by “enlightened” civilian elites), but especially needed to westernize (i.e. rationalize/modernize) their structures in order to offer effective contributions to NATO’s objectives. Despite its instabilities, such as the impossible definition of “contributions” and its politicization within the transatlantic “burden-sharing” debate, this discourse would dominate within the civilian and military communities of “experts” interested in “material” issues and/or assuming the superiority of the “Western” civilian-military model. Moreover, it would be strongly supported by a number of United States Senators hesitant about enlargement’s costs11. Obviously, this inferiorizing discourse was way too unfavourable toward candidates for them to adopt it.
- 12 To be found in: R. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era, Columb (...)
9The simplicity of this discourse was related to the moral and technological leadership of the US, which needed to take charge of the collective defence. Its pro-enlargement problem focused less on military capability than on the loyalty of candidates (all described as “pro-American”), on their ability to cooperate in the defence sector, to provide good support to the hegemonic unipolar caretaker of NATO. Some discursive tensions therefore appear clearly in relation to the technical discourse: not only does it celebrate the disproportionate role played by the US in NATO, but also that the necessities of “modernization”/“contributions” gave way to simple “support”, again without specifying any content. Readers will ultimately see that this discourse was music to the ears of the Bush administration, but also to various lobbies and East-European politicians attracted by the simplicity that this (hegemonic) “normality” implied for their own security.
- 13 See, as part of a vast body of literature, for example: Z. Csergo & J. Goldgeier, “Nationalist Stra (...)
10From a completely different standpoint, this discourse also considered NATO on the basis of a “material” logic: as an alliance of sovereign states. But as opposed to the other discourses, here candidates explicitly state their own strategic objectives: since they have (re)discovered their “stolen” national identity, but still having weak self defence capabilities and being situated in the “unstable” (or “neo-imperialist”) Russian “zone of influence”, Poland and the Baltic States look forward to joining NATO not for its qualities as a technical/American private club, but for its guarantees of security under Article 5.
- 14 D. Trenin, “Silence of the Bear”, NATO Review, Spring 2002, pp. 7-8; A. Pravda, “Russia and Europea (...)
- 15 J. Goldgeier, “Not When But Who”, NATO Review, Spring 2002, p. 4.
11This discourse, popular in the East, has a central weakness: it has the bad habit of revealing the “risks” of integration, related to the safety of both candidates and NATO in provoking and encircling Russia14. It has, moreover, a strong discursive tension with technical discourse: related to the latter, candidates need to modernize, contribute and be active members of this “civilized club”; related to the former, passivity and free- riding does not appear problematic. It combines itself easily with Atlantist discourse: supporting morally those who protect you. Adopted by observers such as Kissinger and Brezinsky15, this discourse, which was suspicious of Russia, would be the strongest signal, even given its weaknesses, of the perpetual fear of the Russian Other.
- 16 Cf.: A. Rotfeld, “The Process of Transforming Foreign and Security Policies”, American Foreign Poli (...)
12NATO here is explicitly homogeneous in its democratic qualities, and has a functional role of stabilization toward candidates in “democratic transition” and being in this difficult and knowable position between “two giants” (Russia and Europe). The legitimate solution is therefore to integrate those who demonstrate stabilizing qualities, transparency and cooperation in defence. Obviously, this seemingly simple discourse has a significant weakness: candidates are both “on course” and “at risk” of (re)turning to border/ethnic tensions if NATO does not offer enough “reassurance” in its “open-door” policy. It has a strong discursive tension with nationalist discourse: how should Russia be considered? A partner or an adversary in continental (de)stabilization? It nevertheless combines itself easily with technical discourse: candidates, on track towards democratization, can contribute easily to regional stabilization through neighbourhood cooperation.
- 17 Cf. A. Velichkin, “NATO as seen through the eyes of the Russian Press”, NATO Review, March 1995 or (...)
13Always supported by candidates, this discourse would sit well with most “Wilsonians” and liberals in Clinton’s administration, in Denmark and in Germany, and in NATO PA (which adopted, between 1991 and 1996, five resolutions favourable to enlargement with “future democracies” in a logic of consolidation by integration). But its tensions in relation to the need to “make Russia happy” appeared clearly to some, such as Helmut Kohl, some Dutch and US liberals, and Russian democrats scared of provoking the nationalists17. So paradoxically, this discourse could be adopted in both pro and anti-enlargement advocates.
- 18 Cf., for example: R. Asmus, op. cit.; M. Webber, op. cit.; A. Gheciu, op. cit.; A. Lasas, “Restitut (...)
- 19 J. Rosner, “The American Public, Congress and NATO Enlargement: Part II – Will Congress back admitt (...)
14Finally, here the West is undivided and reciprocal. Synonymous with homogeneity (historical, cultural and axiological), this discourse clearly plays on the “treasons” of Locarno, Munich or Yalta, and celebrates the “return” of candidates in the family of European/Western democracy, transparency, independence, after they “escaped” from Russia’s “zone of influence”. One blatant weakness of this discourse: it is impossible to prevent the enlargement since it would be against western values. This discourse combines itself easily with others: with grey-zone discourse, despite the difference in terms of democratization, solutions to being a legitimate ally are the same (transparency, civilian control, etc.). The same happens with the nationalist discourse on “common defence”. But, at some point, the “obligation” of the nationalist discourse does not exactly means the “solidarity” of the return-to-Europe discourse. Finally, with the technical discourse: both assuming Western superiority. But again, it remains an incomplete combination: here the identity homogeneity does not necessarily imply homogenization of defence structure. This assumption, in fact, is the common mistake of a number of normative approaches. Other subtleties appear as tensions: with the nationalist discourse (Are we “in” or “out” of Moscow’s zone of influence?), and with the technical discourse (Is NATO our alter ego or definitely light years from us?). Whatever the answers, this discourse would be sustained totally by candidates, and adopted where post-Cold War guilt was strongest (Washington and Berlin, for example) and where East-European lobbies’ rhetoric was the most influential.19 Strangely, it would be less present elsewhere: probably the sole fact of celebrating the identity superiority of the West intrinsically brings exclusivist ideas. Or maybe its axiological basis was no match for other, more “materialistic” discourses?
15The reader therefore can see that there was not one problem/solution on which candidates could focus to be seen as legitimate future-members of NATO. In fact, all these discourses were simultaneously present in the field. Since candidates needed to respond to them all at the same time, it created important discursive distortions in their representations that would be resolved through one legitimate solution for every combination possible: cooperation in defence would then guide the materialization of the dominating discourses in their military transformations.
- 20 NATO, “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept”, 1991, http://www.nato.int, §9.
- 21 Ibid., §45.
- 22 Ibid., §48, a.
- 23 NATO, “PfP Framework Document”, 1994, http://www.nato.int, §1.
- 24 Gen. G. Joulwan [SACEUR], “NATO’s military contribution to Partnership for Peace: The progress and (...)
- 25 For example: “[p]rotection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding (...)
- 26 Ibid. §3, d.
16At the very beginning of the process in 1991, even before the idea of enlargement was on the agenda, the first publicized Strategic Concept of NATO marked the domination of the grey-zone discourse, underlying the probable consequences of instabilities and ethnic disputes in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)20. The technical discourse was just behind: despite continued underlining of their “defensive nature”21, NATO’s armed forces needed to show “demonstrable combat effectiveness together with an appropriately enhanced capability for flexible deployment”22. At the Brussels Summit in January 1994, the grey-zone discourse was again the heart of the new Partnership for Peace (PfP), an inter-military cooperation program developed in order to “deepen [the] political and military ties and to contribute further to the strengthening of security within the Euro-Atlantic area”23, “[b]y extending the hand of friendship to the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and beyond”24. The objective, without promising enlargement, was to promote democracy, transparency, and defence cooperation25. On the other hand, the technical discourse supported the whole by specifying that military cooperation should reinforce the ability to conduct peacekeeping operations26.
- 27 G. von Moltke [Deputy NATO SG for Public Policy], “NATO Moves Toward the Enlargement”, NATO Review, (...)
- 28 Those “necessary defence management reforms” in order to establish democratic control mechanisms of (...)
- 29 G. von Moltke, ibid.
- 30 For example: “[by f]ostering in new members of the Alliance the patterns and habits of cooperation, (...)
- 31 Ibid. §43 (emphasis added); see also §44-45.
- 32 See details at ibid. §76.
- 33 Ibid. §77.
17As previously stated, the principal weakness of the grey-zone discourse quickly revealed itself: “[t]he Alliance and its member countries cannot be indifferent to these understandable aspirations of neighbouring European democracies”27. The slow opening of the “door” led in September 1995 to the Study on NATO Enlargement, which reinforced the discursive combination of grey-zone and technical, held until then in official documents: transparency and democracy28, settlement of ethnic and border tensions with neighbours29, cooperation in defence30. Nevertheless, technical was slowly becoming dominant: being ready “to contribute to collective defence under Article 5 [and] to the Alliance’s new evolving missions”31, in developing total interoperability with NATO forces, and in absorbing some 1200 standardization agreements (STANAGs)32, notably in prioritizing some “cornerstone units”33.
- 34 For example, see J. Trapans, Democracy and Defence in Latvia: Thirteen Years of Development: 1991-2 (...)
- 35 See for example: C. Donnelly, “Reform Realities”, in Post-Cold War Defence Reform: Lessons Learned (...)
- 36 See J. Simon, NATO Enlargement & Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military Relations, University Pr (...)
- 37 J. Amara & M. Packevics, “Unfulfilled Promises: The Impact of Accession on Military Expenditure Tre (...)
- 38 J. Simon, ibid., pp. 99-100.
- 39 Too much participation in exercises, a lack of funds for basic ordnance (J. Simon, ibid, p. 112); a (...)
- 40 R. Epstein, op. cit., pp. 71-72; E. Alder, op. cit., p. 216; A. Krivas, “Armed Forces and Society i (...)
- 41 A. Öövel [Estonia’s Defence Minister], “Estonian defense policy: independance and international coo (...)
- 42 See, for example, M. Kuus, “European Integration in Identity Narratives in Estonia: A Quest for Sec (...)
18Compatible with return-to-Europe, defended in the East, some elements of grey-zone and technical supported by NATO, such as “democratization” of the control of armed forces and transparency in defence policy, quickly materialized (at least, on paper)34. Given the heart of the technical discourse however, all candidates were in a bad position35. Poland more than the rest: she was criticized for deficiencies in training and inefficiencies in maintaining its outdated ordnance36; the size of her army (792 000 troops in 199237); management costs38; the lack of budgets and priorities in spending39. Other “important” problems were underlined about our four candidates: their defence policy oriented towards territorial defence and massive conscription utilization, all signs of the inability to put aside military traditions of self-sufficiency40. Seen by the nationalist discourse however, those policies could only be legitimate. In this order, the Defence Minister of Estonia saw no problem in boasting about its infantry priorities, “attack and hide” strategies/tactics, and spending on “rifles, mortars, short- and medium-range anti-tank weapons, and short-range anti-aircraft weapons”41. Even if candidates’ speeches also combined (in a more or less stable fashion) the return-to-Europe and the grey-zone discourse, as indicated earlier, these nationalist references only helped everyone to recall the “red line” traced by Moscow42. The result: technical suspiciousness, and the weaknesses of the grey-zone (i.e. Russia) discourse was exposed.
19Thus, the technical discourse became reinforced as “normality”: candidates needed to prove some capability to contribute to common defence, and above all to new missions. They therefore used a solution from the grey-zone discourse, which was able to refer implicitly to the nationalist discourse, and to be combined with the return-to-Europe discourse. This solution, a pure product of the discursive combination of the field, was also legitimate for the technical discourse, making candidates appear from passive/unable/inexperienced in new missions, to able to contribute in the security environment: supported by NATO, regional cooperation for developing capabilities to contribute (to national, regional and collective defence) was then the central element of identity representation enabling candidates to be universally legitimate, even though there was still extreme discursive tensions between the technical and the nationalist discourses.
- 43 Col. Juris Dalbins [Latvia National Armed Forces Cmd], “Baltic Cooperation – The key to wider secur (...)
- 44 A. Öövel, “Baltic and Northern European Security: ‘History Does Not Have Holidays’”, 14th Internati (...)
20Those contributions through cooperation were particularly present in the Self of the Baltic States. From 1994, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania jointly developed their Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT), an infantry battalion developed to be interoperable with NATO procedures, “a practical expression of military cooperation without which regional security would be problematic and future membership of NATO would be questionable”43. Then came the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON), which had the task of demining the Baltic Sea coastline; the regional Baltic Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET); and lastly, the Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL), following NATO’s doctrines. In the words of an Estonian representative: “[a]ll of these projects are aimed at strengthening the Baltic States’ defence forces but they are also considered steps toward eligibility for NATO membership”44.
- 45 A. Kwasniewski [President of Poland], “Poland and NATO”, XIIIth NATO Workshop on Political-Military (...)
- 46 Z. Okonski [Poland’s Defence Minister], “Partnership for Peace: An Essential Element of the Europea (...)
- 47 V. Birkavs [Latvia’s Foreign Minister] “Security of Latvia: Historical Parallels and Current and Fu (...)
- 48 A. Saudargas [Lithuania’s Foreign Minister], “The Case for Lithuanian Membership in NATO”, 14th Int (...)
- 49 S. Dobrzanski [Poland’s Defence Minister], “Welcoming Remarks”, XIIIth NATO Workshop, op. cit., htt (...)
- 50 V. Birkavs, op. cit. (emphasis in original).
21Poland, too, had this kind of cooperation, notably with Lithuania under a regional air command, and the Polish-Lithuanian Battalion (LITPOLBAT). But Poland needed, more than anything else, to modernize her forces. Cooperation then was underlined in relation to joint exercises, helping to develop “a strong habit of cooperation”45, “forces that are fully interoperable with NATO”46. Cooperation was therefore key to candidates being seen as contributing to NATO’s “new” missions: “we plan to have the Latvian BALTBAT company participate in IFOR within the Swedish Battalion”47; “[t]he participation of Lithuanian troops [in cooperation with Denmark] in IFOR and SFOR missions”48; “[our Polish] battalion that is part of the IFOR Nordic-Polish Brigade in Bosnia-Herzegovina”49. This cooperation directly enabled candidates to say “one should not enjoy – or consume – security without participating in producing it”50.
- 51 L. Meri [President of Estonia], “NATO and Europe: An Agenda for the Coming Years”, 15th Internation (...)
- 52 Ibid. (emphasis added); “We declared ourself more ready to defend our sovereignty: [g]ranted, they (...)
- 53 V. Adamkus, [President of Lithuania] “New Challenges to European Security and NATO”, 15th Internati (...)
- 54 NATO, “The Washington Declaration”, 1999, http://www.nato.int, §7.
- 55 NATO, “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept”, 1999, http://www.nato.int, §51e.
- 56 Ibid. §53d, 55.
22The instabilities of the grey-zone discourse, but equally the tensions between the technical and nationalist discourses did not totally disappeared. In fact, in 1997, NATO (or, let’s say, the US), decided to invite Poland to negotiate her admission, intentionally putting aside the Baltic States: the support of the US Senate was far from confirmed, and the relationship with Russia was more difficult than ever. In this context, with the exception of NATO-Russia relationship in a grey-zone logic, the technical discourse was everywhere dominant, from the Madrid Declaration in 1997 to the vast majority of NATO Review issues in this period (“burden-sharing”; “crisis management”; European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI); Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF); etc.). Balts’ representations therefore looked resilient, but pragmatic: “[a]s some analysts have put it, ‘NATO has enough tanks already’ ”51. Despite tensions, they still said they were open to the new technical missions although they supported the nationalist discourse: “[w]hile it would be difficult to use our popular army for NATO tasks beyond our borders, it would be equally difficult to keep large numbers of infantryman in total readiness”52. However, “[the] long list of trilateral projects beginning with ‘B’ that are either underway or being developed”53 were part of all discourses. The Washington Summit in 1999, with the formalization of a new Strategic Concept and the adoption of the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI), laid one more stone for the dominance of the technical discourse54: priority was given to flexibility and remote deployability55 of a variety of projects, all needing “highly qualified personnel with a broad spectrum of skills”56.
- 57 A. Kwasniewski, “Key Aspects of Poland’s Presence in NATO as the Security Environment Changes”, 16t (...)
- 58 See, for example: K. Longhurst, “From security consumer to security provider: Poland and transatlan (...)
- 59 NATO PA, “Report NATO Enlargement”, Committee Report, Political Sub-Committee on Central and Easter (...)
- 60 NATO PA, “Report of the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities. ‘Military Prepar (...)
- 61 Ibid., II, §9; NATO PA; ibid., 2001, II, A.
- 62 NATO PA, ibid., 2002, II, §9.
- 63 Ibid., II, §8, §9; NATO PA; ibid., 2001, II, A.
- 64 K. Longhurst, ibid., pp. 58-59.
- 65 Witness # 2.
- 66 B. Geremek [Poland’s Foreign Minister], “The Impact of Kosovo on the Future of NATO and its Members (...)
23Poland, which finally got US Senate approval, was expressing some nationalist elements: “[c]oming under the NATO umbrella has given us a feeling of security, and leverages our chances of growth”57. But in the context where DCI, Kosovo and RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) were central to the collective Self, Poland needed to work hard. On all sides, Poland then was attacked by the technical discourse58, even from NATO PA: “their armed forces are too big and too heavy, they are under-funded and, in part, poorly equipped”59, “[sharing] the debilitating legacy of Warsaw Pact military doctrine”60, “[needing] to develop larger non-commissioned and junior officer corps, and to phase out a surplus of high-level officers”61, “[having] shortcomings [in] planning, budgets, and personnel restructuring”62, “[having] constitutional and legal system inadequacies, and outdated national security and defence concepts”63. Moreover, conscription rubbed them the wrong way64, and the lack of a civilian “strategic culture” led to doubts about real democratic control of her armed forces. From day one, Poland was far from being “prepared”65, and many mea culpas flowed thereafter: “we must speed up the adaptation of our armed forces”66.
- 67 B. Komorowski [Poland’s Defence Minister], “Reforming Poland’s Military”, NATO Review, Summer 2001.
- 68 B. Komorowski, op. cit.
- 69 A. Karkozka “Following the Footsteps”, NATO Review, Spring 2002, pp. 10-11.
24The Programme of Restructuring and Technical Modernization of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland 2001-2006 tried to address all these questions: reducing the size of the army to 150 000 (half of them “professionals”) for 2006; inverting hierarchical pyramids67, and above all developing one third of the army into “High Operation Readiness Units” interoperable with NATO68. To technical observers, this project was doubtful: it could end in a “two-tier” force structure having, on one side, a minority receiving all the human, modernization and material resources, and on the other side, the majority lacking of everything, even morale69. Furthermore, the final picture of this program was more of a territorial defence able to interoperate with NATO.
- 70 NATO PA, op. cit., 2001, II, §7 (emphasis added).
- 71 See, for example, S. Croft, op. cit., p. 107; M. Webber, op. cit., pp. 94-95.
- 72 See, for details, NATO, “Membership Action Plan”, 1999, http://www.nato.int, II§1.
- 73 Special thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this thought on MAP’s political dimension.
- 74 NATO PA, op. cit., 2001, VI.
- 75 J. Goldgeier, op. cit. 2002.
25The lack of precision of technical “contributions” would, however, quickly reappear and limit the strength of its normalizing effects. In fact, every observer agreed that through regional military diplomacy, defence cooperation, and through their (teamed) participation in the Balkans (Bosnia and Kosovo), Polish armed forces “are making a net contribution to the security of the Alliance”70. All the “insufficiencies” of the Balts, however, were still under technical firepower71. In this order, the 1999 Membership Action Plan (MAP) of NATO concretized various of its elements72. Nor was it the end of grey-zone: candidates needed to continue working on societal issues, such as border and inter-ethnic relationships with Russian-speaking minorities73, at the very moment where tensions between NATO and Russia pushed some to say that “[Baltic states] could not be defended against an all-out attack”74. The strong instability of the grey-zone discourse would also complicate its normalizing effects: NATO promised candidates that it would revise their status in 2002, whatever happened….75
- 76 L. Linkevicius [Lithuania’s Defence Minister], “Cooperative Activities in the Baltic Sea Area”, 18t (...)
- 77 J. Luik [Estonia’s Defence Minister], “NATO’s Role in a Future Europe”, 16th International Workshop (...)
- 78 V. Adamkus, “Euro-Atlantic Enlargement: A Baltic Perspective”, 17th International Workshop on Globa (...)
26These discursive tensions pushed the Baltic States in various directions. Although Lithuania seemed to look for self-deployment, without “baltification”, its technical elements had the colours of a return-to-Europe/nationalist discourse: “[b]y the end of the year 2002, Lithuania plans to prepare a completely NATO-interoperable battalion potentially available for Article 5 deployments on Lithuanian soil ... also be capable of ... NATO-led peace-support operations”.76 Estonia was criticizing the lack of specialization in NATO77, and was joining Latvia in awkwardly combining return-to-Europe and nationalist discourses: “[Europe] clings to one, or at best two, dimensions of security, and tends to overlook their indivisible character. But can some parts of Europe be regarded as ‘indefensible’ because of their size and geographic location?”78.
- 79 J. Goldgeier, op. cit., 2002; D. Trenin, op. cit., 2002.
- 80 A. Rotfeld [Poland’s Foreign Minister], Seminar on the role of EAPC in combating terrorism, Februar (...)
- 81 V. Adamkus, “Expanding Security in Europe Through Military and Non-Military Means”, 19th Internatio (...)
27The 12th of September 2001, for the first time of its history, NATO invoked the “common defence” clause (Article 5 of the Washington Treaty), officially placing two discourses at the forefront: the Atlantist discourse and the solidarity/superiority package of the return-to-Europe discourse. Obviously, it would not take long for the Bush administration looking for “support” to forget Russia’s ambivalence towards a new enlargement79. Poland, stating “[u]nited we stand”80, was now an exceptional ally, and Lithuania (for example) was “supporting” NATO by stating its willingness to position 1000 troops in the Balkans in order to “free” 1000 troops for the Afghan campaign81!
- 82 NATO PA, op. cit., 2001, VI.
28However, the general discursive dominance was still very imprecise. A NATO PA report confirmed in that regard that “[t]he Alliance has to balance a number of ‘competing demands’ as it approaches its next round of enlargement”82, and NATO Review issues of the following months would denote in a few months the transition from blind solidarity (“Combating New Security Threats”, Winter 2001) to simple prognoses without real debate on the upcoming Prague Summit (“Examining Enlargement”, Spring 2002), finally reaching the main dominant questions of the coming years: Iraq, unilateralism, “burden-sharing” (“Capabilities, Capabilities, Capabilities”, Fall 2002). The discursive instability was such that it even offered legitimate space to the nationalist discourse: independence and territoriality of the primus inter pares having been attacked.
- 83 Democratic control of armed forces was, on the other side, reached: In Estonia “Civilian supervisio (...)
- 84 NATO PA, op. cit., 2002, V, B, pp. 48-51.
- 85 Ibid., V, C, 55-57; NATO PA, op. cit., 2001, III, D.
- 86 Ibid., III, E; NATO PA, op. cit., 2002, V, D, 62-67; NATO PA, “146 DSCFC 03E – Invited NATO Members (...)
29Therefore, the breaches of the political criteria of MAP83, notably those related to inter-ethnic relationships, were totally overlooked. But above all, candidates’ military transformations could develop freely and legitimately in terms of territorial and/or common defence. In Estonia for example, they openly declared to a NATO PA rapporteur that they were hoping to maintain conscription and to establish one battalion for deployment (ESTBAT) and another, “high-ready”, for internal deployment84. Latvia was also developing its response battalion (LATBAT), and kept its long-term objective to maintain not only conscription, by also to train a ready-to-call reserve force in the case of natural disasters or war85. Lithuania, like the two others, maintained conscription and planned to develop, for October 2006, a quick-response brigade, “Iron Wolf”, able to operate with NATO under Article 5. Despite the development of a special Jaeger operations battalion, their objective was clear: develop forces geared toward territorial defence able to operate with NATO’s assistance86. Symptomatic of those developments, it was not planned that BALTBAT would be deactivated, in order to concentrate on national projects.
- 87 M. Grossman [US Deputy Secretary of State for Policy], “New capabilities, new members, new relation (...)
- 88 Gen. K. Naumann [Former chair, NATO Military Committee], “Crunch Time for the Alliance”, NATO Revie (...)
- 89 NATO, “Prague Summit Declaration”, 2002, http://www.nato.int, §4c.
- 90 Ibid. §4c; Witness # 3.
- 91 S. Woehrel, J. Kim, C. Ek, “Report for Congress: NATO Applicant States: A Status Report”, Library o (...)
30The invitation of Baltic States during the Prague Summit in November 2002 was a surprise to no one, especially not the US State Department: “[t]he Vilnius Group of candidate countries … declared its shared intention to “fully support the war against terrorism” and “act as Allies of the United States”. And they have delivered, reinforcing our belief that a larger NATO would be a stronger Alliance”87. The discursive instability in NATO was, however, far from over: NATO, with Iraq as a backdrop, was in real political crisis88. But officially, unity was built on combining technical and Atlantist discourses: deployability and support89, a discursive combination able to sustain specialization trends90. For the Balts, this was translated in, on the one hand, the collective projects that were still active (notably, BALTNET, BALTRON, and the medical unit BALTMED), and on the other, in units useful in the context of common defence: Latvia and Estonia worked to develop military police, demining and/or decontamination teams; Lithuania and Latvia also intended to develop specialities in special operations91, something Poland did as well.
- 92 NATO PA, op. cit., 2003, IV, C, 40.
- 93 L. Linkevicius, “Will There Be More or Less Security for Europe After Enlargement?”, 20th Internati (...)
- 94 NATO PA, op. cit., 2003 IV, D, pp. 47-53.
- 95 A. Linkevicius, “Global Responses to the 21st Century Challenges”, 21st International Workshop on G (...)
- 96 Ibid.
- 97 NATO PA, op. cit., 2002, II, 14; see also K. Longhurst, op. cit., pp. 57-58.
- 98 Witness # 4, # 3 ; A. Cottey, T. Edmunds, A. Forster, “Beyond Prague”, NATO Review, Fall 2002.
- 99 NATO PA, op. cit., 2002, V, D, 68.
- 100 S. Woehrel, J. Kim, C. Ek, op. cit., pp. 17, 21.
- 101 Ibid., p. 13.
- 102 Ibid. p. 17; NATO PA, op. cit., 2002 V, C, 58.
31At this point, the story became complicated: Did they still have to response directly to the technical discourse? Latvia chose to do so in declaring to a sub-committee of the NATO PA that she hoped to scrap conscription for 200892. Lithuania, by far the most “motivated”, declared her intention of “dropping our outdated territorial defence posture”93, including conscription94, in order to encourage the growth of her “expeditionary forces [that can] carry out pre-emptive actions (we do need a world police force)”95. The same representative ended his speech with an amazing rhetorical question: “What can be more heroic than to risk one’s life fighting for the peace and welfare of another nation?”96. But the weaknesses of this discourse (on “contributions”) were still too important to be avoided: some new members were roundly criticized, on the one hand, because they were “unable to contribute significantly to technology-intensive services, such as air forces”97 and, on the other hand, for having “unusefully spent” on territorial defence in buying top material, such as fighter jets98. The true “contributions” were therefore expected to come from an Atlantist support, the most stable and legitimate discourse in the context. Poland (one of the first nations to deploy 2000 troops in Iraq in the “Coalition of the Willing” even facing public opinion that was strongly opposed) and the Balts quickly understood the call. The Lithuanian participation in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF, the US coalition in Afghanistan) in 2002 consisted of medical troops and 40 special forces99, and in Iraq, medical troops and logistics100. Estonia deployed an explosive detection unit to OEF in July 2002, and logistics to ISAF in March 2003. Moreover, she declared herself “interested”, in March 2003, in deploying 55 troops in Iraq in explosives detection and logistics, as well as deploying a light infantry platoon101. Latvia deployed an air control unit to OEF and medical teams to ISAF, and “promised” in March 2003 three dozens troops (most of them military police and medical units) to post-conflict Iraq102.
- 103 Witness # 2.
- 104 Ibid.
- 105 Witness # 5.
32Some observers have seen in that the internalization of some “liberal-internationalist identity”, and others, a rational decision against an objective enemy (“terrorism” or “Saddam”). But for Poland (already in NATO) as for Baltic States (awaiting formalization in Istanbul), it was more the intention to show solidarity with the Alliance103, support for Article 5104, and even a try to establish an insurance policy against Russia105. Participation in the deployments was therefore, in our terms, the materialization of the idea of contribution by cooperation, a legitimate solution to the multiple and combined identity representations that dominated the discursive field of NATO enlargement at that moment in time, from the purely technical to a simple reminder of Article 5 obligations in a nationalist logic.
- 106 R. Asmus, “Great expectations”, NATO Review, June 2003.
- 107 NATO, “Istanbul Summit Communiqué”, 2004, http://www.nato.int, §20.
- 108 A. Valionis [Lithuania’s Defence Minister], Ceremonial Session of the North Atlantic Council on the (...)
- 109 V. Vike-Freiberga [President of Latvia], Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, June 28, 2004, http (...)
- 110 T. Kouts [Estonia Defence Forces Cmd], “Security: How Shall We Respond to Present Challenges?”, 22n (...)
- 111 T. Valasek, “The meaning of enlargement”, NATO Review, April 2004.
33For one observer, “[t]he paradox is that just as Central and Eastern Europeans arrive at their destination in the West, the Western Alliance they have worked so hard to join increasingly appears in disarray”106. At this very moment of Balts’ accession to NATO in 2004, discursive fractures within and the loss of strength of the technical discourse as the normalizing power (despite some calls for deployability)107 were clear to everyone. As opposed to Poland in 1999 (which still needed to face a field dominated by technicalities), Latvia and Lithuania, two years before so “expeditionary”, could finally show themselves to be resolutely nationalists: “[w]e applaud NATO’s decision to provide air defence capabilities and equal protection to the entire territory of the enlarged Alliance”108, “[t]hat sense [of] mutual support is crucial to us … it is not theoretical, it is not illusionary, it is very real”109. Estonia, on her side, was more candid than ever: “[e]stablishing a legal basis [for intervention] will require the review and amending of a number of existing legal acts ... impossible without wide public support”110. As one observer noted: “[a]s accession countries know all too well, their new freedom of choice includes the freedom to stay out of “somebody else’s” wars”111.
- 112 NATO, “Comprehensive Political Guidance”, 2006, http://www.nato.int, §5; Witness # 1, # 2, # 6.
- 113 NATO, “Riga Summit Declaration”, 2006, http://www.nato.int, §43.
- 114 Witness # 5, # 6.
- 115 G. Kirkilas [Lithuania’s Defence Minister], NATO Annual Conference: Transforming NATO – A Political (...)
- 116 F. Gagor [Chief of Staff, Poland’s Armed Forces], “NATO After the Riga Summit: A Polish Perspective (...)
34One further step was taken in 2006 at the Riga Summit, the first where all the newcomers could participate in the inscription of NATO’s “normality”. The Comprehensive Political Guidance (a revision of the Strategic Concept) proves this. Obviously, the principal threats corresponded to the contextual wishes of the leader: WMDs and terrorism. But reflecting some unfinished regional societal/border issues despite MAP, and symptomatic of the “events” of 2005-2006 in the energy sector between Russia and Ukraine, the nationalist discourse, hostile to Russia, earned some legitimacy in the discursive field. Not only was it expressed for the first time that challenges to “vital” resource supply could influence “[t]he character of potential Article 5 challenges”112, but the text dared to thumb its nose at Russia by underscoring our “support [for] territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova”113. According to all the witnesses interviewed, the NATO-Russia relationship was totally changed114. Some now qualified it as “‘us’ versus ‘them’”. Faced with a “different” conception of the Alliance, mainly through a nationalist discourse, the Baltic States were now inscribing the limits of normality, of the Self, in a different fashion: reducing the momentum of transformations, and returning to the fact that “NATO must maintain a clear military focus in all its activities”115. Poland seemed the only one of the four trying to reconcile, to a certain extent, the technical discourse (weakened, but still dominant in the field at the time) with territorial defence: “the capabilities may be split into those necessary to conduct current operations and those that would allow us, in the future, to preserve NATO superiority over potential adversaries”116.
- 117 Witness # 2.
- 118 A. Krivas, op. cit., pp. 114, 117.
- 119 Witness # 1, # 4.
- 120 J. Trapans, “Armed Forces and Society in Latvia: A Decade of Development”, in A. Forster, T. Edmund (...)
35Like the Baltic States, and despite some critics underscoring cases of corruption, mismanagement or cronyism, Poland has highly institutionalized the legitimate solutions common to all discourses (democratization, legislative control of the armed forces, etc.), and even reached its objective of 150 000 troops at transformed hierarchical ratios. However, pro-technical observers or those claiming the superiority of “modern Western strategic culture” would be deceived: Poland was in 2006 very far from this announced expeditionary “homogenization”. Territorial defence was clear and strong117. Lithuania still promoted conscription and territorial defence118, as did Estonia, which continued to underline the fact that she might need to fight on her own territory119. Only Latvia, despite her territorial model, ended conscription in 2007, although some “experts” underlined some years before its functional necessity as an engine for national unity120. In our terms, the tensions and instabilities of the various discourses present at the same time in the discursive field help to understand this differentiation in materialization: although the technical discourse had its normalizing role, grey-zone, nationalist and return-to-Europe discourses were never totally absent from it either. The specific and legitimate combination they proposed—cooperation in defence—therefore translated itself on the whole through the development of a small “elite” deployable and interoperable with NATO. Those specialized elites, notably military police, demining, and decontamination, were, to the Balts, particularly useful and legitimate to territorial defence projects, while also avoiding significant technical restructurings.
36Starting the analysis with the discursive field, we have tried to trace the materialization process in which Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania directly participated through repetitions and reiterations of dominant identity representations. But above all, we have tried to show the centrality of this field for military reforms in a social environment of collectivized security. The observation of such a process through a discursive ontology has many advantages: the avoidance of some problematic assumptions, such as assuming the inherent power of certain “common” norms of identity, or worse, their superiority. We can also see that relationship between NATO and its new members was not a simple fusion of two worlds, or a basic instrumental relationship, but the meeting of various discourses, different problems/legitimate solutions linked to particular events, leaving sufficient space for creativity. Lastly, it prompts us to look at the effect, not only on defence policies, but also on the collective “normality”, which is always very flexible, of the act of reiteration of the borders between identity and difference, particularly the eternally persistent border between a certain Western Self and a certain Russian Other.
1 Cf. T. Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, P. Katzenstein (Ed.), Columbia University Press, New York, 1996, p. 395; A. Gheciu, “Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the ‘‘New Europe’’, International Organization, Vol. 59, 2005, p. 975; E. Adler, “The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO’s Post Cold War Transformations”, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 14, # 2, 2008, pp. 195-230; R. Epstein, “‘NATO Enlargement and the Spread of Democracy: Evidence and Expectations”, Security Studies, Vol. 14, # 1, 2005, pp. 63–105.
2 J. Der Derian, “The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard”, in On Security, R. Lipschutz (Ed.), Columbia University Press, New York, 1995, pp. 33-35.
3 D. Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (revised edition), University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1998, pp. 3, 9; S. Dalby, “Contesting an Essential Concept: Reading the Dilemmas in Contemporary Security Discourse”, in Critical Security Studies, K. Krause & M. C. Williams, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1997, p. 10; L. Hansen, Security As Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, Routledge, London, 2006, pp. 7, 46-50.
4 M. Foucault, Sécurité, Territoire, Population: Cours au Collège de France 1977-1978, Seuil/Gallimard, Paris, 2004 .
5 Ibid.; C. Murphy, International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance since 1850, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994, pp. 32-34.
6 L. Hansen, ibid, pp. 1-2, 6-8
7 Cf. R. Bleiker, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, pp. 133-136; Murphy, op. cit.
8 L. Hansen, ibid., pp. 32-33.
9 R. Bleiker, op. cit, pp. 127-128.
10 In a large body of work, see for example: M. Clarke, P. Cornish, “The European Defence Project and the Prague Summit”, International Affairs, Vol. 78, # 4, October 2002, pp. 777-788; S. Siegel, “Bearing their share of the burden: Europe in Afghanistan”, European Security, Vol. 18, # 4, 2009, pp. 461-482; S. Croft, “Guaranteeing Europe’s Security? Enlarging NATO Again”, International Affairs, Vol. 78, # 1, January 2002, pp. 93-114; Z. Barany, The Future of NATO Expansion, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003.
11 S. Cambone, “Will the US Senate endorse NATO’s enlargement?”, NATO Review, November 1997.
12 To be found in: R. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era, Columbia University Press, New York, 2002; I. Daalder & J. Goldgeier, “Global NATO”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, # 5, 2006, pp. 105-114; D. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, 1998; R. Asmus, A. Vondra, “The Origins of Atlanticism in Central and Eastern Europe”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, # 2, 2005, pp. 203-216.
13 See, as part of a vast body of literature, for example: Z. Csergo & J. Goldgeier, “Nationalist Strategies and European Integration”, Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 2, # 1, March 2004, pp. 21-37; T. Kostadinova, “East European Public Support for NATO Membership: Fears and Aspirations”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, #2, March 2000, pp. 235-249; L. Karabeshkin & D. Sprechler, “EU and NATO Enlargement: Russia’s Expectations, Responses and Options for the Future”, European Security, Vol. 16, # 3&4, September 2007, pp. 307-328.
14 D. Trenin, “Silence of the Bear”, NATO Review, Spring 2002, pp. 7-8; A. Pravda, “Russia and European Security: The Delicate Balance”, NATO Review, May 1995.
15 J. Goldgeier, “Not When But Who”, NATO Review, Spring 2002, p. 4.
16 Cf.: A. Rotfeld, “The Process of Transforming Foreign and Security Policies”, American Foreign Policy Interests, Vol. 29, # 1, January 2007, pp. 59-72; M. Webber, Inclusion, Exclusion and the Governance of European Security, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2007; A. Kydd, “Trust Building, Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement”, International Organization, Vol. 55, # 4, Fall 2001, pp. 801-828; M. C. Williams & I. Neumann, “From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia and the Power of Identity”, Millenium, Vol. 29, # 2, pp. 357-387.
17 Cf. A. Velichkin, “NATO as seen through the eyes of the Russian Press”, NATO Review, March 1995 or F. Bolkestein, “NATO: deepening and broadening?”, NATO Review, July 1996.
18 Cf., for example: R. Asmus, op. cit.; M. Webber, op. cit.; A. Gheciu, op. cit.; A. Lasas, “Restituting Victims: EU and NATO enlargement through the lenses of collective guilt”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 15, # 1, January 2008, pp. 98-116; F. Schimmelfenning, The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003.
19 J. Rosner, “The American Public, Congress and NATO Enlargement: Part II – Will Congress back admitting new members?”, NATO Review, January 1997.
21 Ibid., §45.
22 Ibid., §48, a.
23 NATO, “PfP Framework Document”, 1994, http://www.nato.int, §1.
24 Gen. G. Joulwan [SACEUR], “NATO’s military contribution to Partnership for Peace: The progress and the challenge”, NATO Review, March 1995.
25 For example: “[p]rotection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, peace through democracy” (PfP Framework Document, ibid. §2).
26 Ibid. §3, d.
27 G. von Moltke [Deputy NATO SG for Public Policy], “NATO Moves Toward the Enlargement”, NATO Review, January 1996.
28 Those “necessary defence management reforms” in order to establish democratic control mechanisms of armed forces, transparent planning, accountability, following “internationally-accepted norms of behaviour” (NATO, “Study on NATO Enlargement”, 1995, http://www.nato.int, §39 (emphasis added).
29 G. von Moltke, ibid.
30 For example: “[by f]ostering in new members of the Alliance the patterns and habits of cooperation, consultation and consensus” (Study on NATO Enlargement, ibid. §3 (emphasis added).
31 Ibid. §43 (emphasis added); see also §44-45.
32 See details at ibid. §76.
33 Ibid. §77.
34 For example, see J. Trapans, Democracy and Defence in Latvia: Thirteen Years of Development: 1991-2004” in Civil-Military Relations in Postcommunist Europe: Reviewing the Transition, T. Edmunds, A. Cottey, A. Forster (Eds.), Routledge, London, 2006, p. 53; A. Cottey, T. Edmunds. A. Forster, “Civil-Military Relations in Postcommunist Europe: Assessing the Transition”, in T. Edmunds, A. Cottey, A. Forster, ibid, p. 3; P. Latawski, “The Transformation of Postcommunist Civil-military Relations in Poland”, in T. Edmunds, A. Cottey, A. Forster, ibid, pp. 35-37.
35 See for example: C. Donnelly, “Reform Realities”, in Post-Cold War Defence Reform: Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States, I. Gyarmati & T. Winkler (Eds.), Potomac Books, Washington D.C., 2002, pp. 36-44
36 See J. Simon, NATO Enlargement & Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military Relations, University Press of the Pacific, Honolulu, 2002, p. 95.
37 J. Amara & M. Packevics, “Unfulfilled Promises: The Impact of Accession on Military Expenditure Trends for New NATO Members”, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 29, #5, 2010, pp. 432-449.
38 J. Simon, ibid., pp. 99-100.
39 Too much participation in exercises, a lack of funds for basic ordnance (J. Simon, ibid, p. 112); a lack of flying hours versus buying new planes (C. Donnelly, “Defence Transformation in the New Democracies”, NATO Review, November 1996).
40 R. Epstein, op. cit., pp. 71-72; E. Alder, op. cit., p. 216; A. Krivas, “Armed Forces and Society in Lithuania”, in Soldiers and Societies in Postcommunist Europe: Legitimacy and Change, A. Forster, T. Edmunds, A. Cottey (Eds.), Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, pp. 114, 117; Latawski, ibid, pp. 39-40; G. Miniotaitè, “The Baltic States: In Search of Security and Identity”, in Almost NATO: Partners and Players in Central and Eastern European Security, C. Krupnick (Ed.), Rowman & Littlefield, 2003.
41 A. Öövel [Estonia’s Defence Minister], “Estonian defense policy: independance and international cooperation”, NATO Review, September 1996.
42 See, for example, M. Kuus, “European Integration in Identity Narratives in Estonia: A Quest for Security”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 39, #1, January 2002, pp. 91-108; R. Asmus, op. cit.; L. Karabeshkin & D. Sprechler, op. cit.; Krivas, ibid., pp. 112, 117.
43 Col. Juris Dalbins [Latvia National Armed Forces Cmd], “Baltic Cooperation – The key to wider security”, NATO Review, January 1996.
44 A. Öövel, “Baltic and Northern European Security: ‘History Does Not Have Holidays’”, 14th International Workshop on Global Security, Prague, June 21-25 1997, http://www.csdr.org/97Book/oovel-C.htm.
45 A. Kwasniewski [President of Poland], “Poland and NATO”, XIIIth NATO Workshop on Political-Military Decision Making”, Warsaw, Poland, June 19-23, 1996, http://www.csdr.org/96Book/Kwasniewski.htm (emphasis added).
46 Z. Okonski [Poland’s Defence Minister], “Partnership for Peace: An Essential Element of the European Security System”, XIIth NATO Workshop on Political-Military Decision Making, Dresden, Germany, June 18-22 1995, http://www.csdr.org/95Book/Okonski.htm.
47 V. Birkavs [Latvia’s Foreign Minister] “Security of Latvia: Historical Parallels and Current and Future Challenges”, XIIIth NATO Workshop, ibid., http://www.csdr.org/96Book/Birkavs.htm.
48 A. Saudargas [Lithuania’s Foreign Minister], “The Case for Lithuanian Membership in NATO”, 14th International Workshop, ibid., http://www.csdr.org/97Book/saudargas-C.htm (emphasis added).
50 V. Birkavs, op. cit. (emphasis in original).
51 L. Meri [President of Estonia], “NATO and Europe: An Agenda for the Coming Years”, 15th International Workshop on Global Security, Vienna, June 19-23 1998, http://www.csdr.org/98Book/meri.htm.
52 Ibid. (emphasis added); “We declared ourself more ready to defend our sovereignty: [g]ranted, they cannot muster the defence forces of Poland. But there is no doubt that they would fiercely oppose any attempts to subject them to a foreign rule” (ibid.).
56 Ibid. §53d, 55.
57 A. Kwasniewski, “Key Aspects of Poland’s Presence in NATO as the Security Environment Changes”, 16th International Workshop on Global Security, Budapest, June 20-23 1999, http://www.csdr.org/99Book/kwasniewski.htm.
58 See, for example: K. Longhurst, “From security consumer to security provider: Poland and transatlantic security in the twenty-first century”, Defence Studies, Vol.2, # 2, 2002, pp. 50-62; J. Simon, “Roadmap to NATO Accession: Preparing for Membership”, INSS Special Report, October 2001, pp. 2-3.
59 NATO PA, “Report NATO Enlargement”, Committee Report, Political Sub-Committee on Central and Eastern Europe, October 2001, http://www.nato-pa.int/archivedpub/comrep/2001/au-214-e.asp, II, A.
60 NATO PA, “Report of the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities. ‘Military Preparations of NATO Candidate Countries’”, 2002, http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=245, II, §9.
61 Ibid., II, §9; NATO PA; ibid., 2001, II, A.
62 NATO PA, ibid., 2002, II, §9.
63 Ibid., II, §8, §9; NATO PA; ibid., 2001, II, A.
64 K. Longhurst, ibid., pp. 58-59.
65 Witness # 2.
67 B. Komorowski [Poland’s Defence Minister], “Reforming Poland’s Military”, NATO Review, Summer 2001.
68 B. Komorowski, op. cit.
69 A. Karkozka “Following the Footsteps”, NATO Review, Spring 2002, pp. 10-11.
70 NATO PA, op. cit., 2001, II, §7 (emphasis added).
71 See, for example, S. Croft, op. cit., p. 107; M. Webber, op. cit., pp. 94-95.
73 Special thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this thought on MAP’s political dimension.
74 NATO PA, op. cit., 2001, VI.
75 J. Goldgeier, op. cit. 2002.
76 L. Linkevicius [Lithuania’s Defence Minister], “Cooperative Activities in the Baltic Sea Area”, 18th International Workshop on Global Security, Copenhagen, May 24-27, 2001, http://www.csdr.org/2001Book/linkevicius.htm (emphasis added).
79 J. Goldgeier, op. cit., 2002; D. Trenin, op. cit., 2002.
82 NATO PA, op. cit., 2001, VI.
83 Democratic control of armed forces was, on the other side, reached: In Estonia “Civilian supervision of the military is maintained through parliamentary control of the defence budget as well as defence policy guidelines [the first adopted in 2001]. Moreover, Parliament approves the nomination of the commander of the armed forces. The President is commander-in-chief of the armed forces and appoints top military officers; the defence minister is a civilian” (NATO PA, op. cit., 2001, III, C). In Latvia, “civilian control of the military is exerted through the existing legislative framework which provides parliament with authority over the defence budget as well as over laws concerning national defence. During 2000, the Minister of Defence, a position held by a civilian, presented to the Parliament for the first time a report on national defence policy and development in the national armed forces. On the basis of this report, “The White Book”, which will be prepared annually, was published” (Ibid. III, D). In Lithuania, “the President of Lithuania is the Supreme Commander of the armed forces. The Ministry of Defence is responsible for the preparation of defence plans and the request for and implementation of the defence budget, which is adopted and controlled by the Seimas” (ibid. III, E).
84 NATO PA, op. cit., 2002, V, B, pp. 48-51.
85 Ibid., V, C, 55-57; NATO PA, op. cit., 2001, III, D.
86 Ibid., III, E; NATO PA, op. cit., 2002, V, D, 62-67; NATO PA, “146 DSCFC 03E – Invited NATO Members, Progress on Military Reforms”, 2003, IV, D, 46, http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=364.
87 M. Grossman [US Deputy Secretary of State for Policy], “New capabilities, new members, new relationships”, NATO Review, Summer 2002
88 Gen. K. Naumann [Former chair, NATO Military Committee], “Crunch Time for the Alliance”, NATO Review, Summer 2002.
90 Ibid. §4c; Witness # 3.
91 S. Woehrel, J. Kim, C. Ek, “Report for Congress: NATO Applicant States: A Status Report”, Library of Congress, RL 30168, 2003, pp. 16, 20; NATO PA, op. cit., 2002, V, C, 58; NATO PA, op. cit., 2003, IV, C, 42 and IV, D, pp. 46-49.
92 NATO PA, op. cit., 2003, IV, C, 40.
93 L. Linkevicius, “Will There Be More or Less Security for Europe After Enlargement?”, 20th International Workshop on Global Security, Moscow, June 27-30, 2003, http://www.csdr.org/moscow03/linkevicius.htm.
94 NATO PA, op. cit., 2003 IV, D, pp. 47-53.
97 NATO PA, op. cit., 2002, II, 14; see also K. Longhurst, op. cit., pp. 57-58.
98 Witness # 4, # 3 ; A. Cottey, T. Edmunds, A. Forster, “Beyond Prague”, NATO Review, Fall 2002.
99 NATO PA, op. cit., 2002, V, D, 68.
100 S. Woehrel, J. Kim, C. Ek, op. cit., pp. 17, 21.
101 Ibid., p. 13.
102 Ibid. p. 17; NATO PA, op. cit., 2002 V, C, 58.
103 Witness # 2.
105 Witness # 5.
106 R. Asmus, “Great expectations”, NATO Review, June 2003.
108 A. Valionis [Lithuania’s Defence Minister], Ceremonial Session of the North Atlantic Council on the Occasion of the Accession of Seven New Members to the Alliance, April 2, 2004 (emphasis added); Witness # 6.
110 T. Kouts [Estonia Defence Forces Cmd], “Security: How Shall We Respond to Present Challenges?”, 22nd International Workshop on Global Security, Paris, June 10-12, 2005, http://www.csdr.org/2005book/kouts.htm.
111 T. Valasek, “The meaning of enlargement”, NATO Review, April 2004.
114 Witness # 5, # 6.
116 F. Gagor [Chief of Staff, Poland’s Armed Forces], “NATO After the Riga Summit: A Polish Perspective”, 24th International Workshop on Global Security, Paris, 2007, http://www.csdr.org/2007book/gagor07.htm (emphasis added).
117 Witness # 2.
118 A. Krivas, op. cit., pp. 114, 117.
119 Witness # 1, # 4.
120 J. Trapans, “Armed Forces and Society in Latvia: A Decade of Development”, in A. Forster, T. Edmunds, A. Cottey (Eds.), op. cit., 2003, p. 117; J. Amara & M. Paskevics, op. cit., pp. .440-441.Top of page
Marc-Olivier Castagner, « Discursive Fields and Military Transformations: Poland and the Baltic States as Legitimate Members of NATO », The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies [Online], Issue 14/15 | 2013, Online since 31 December 2012, connection on 30 March 2017. URL : http://pipss.revues.org/4004Top of page
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